Abstract-We study transportation networks controlled by dynamic feedback tolls. We focus on a multiscale model whereby the dynamics of the traffic flows are intertwined with those of the drivers' route choices. The latter are influenced by the current congestion through the network as well as decentralized congestion-dependent tolls set by the system planner. Our main result proves that a class of decentralized monotone congestiondependent tolls allow for globally stabilising the transportation network around a generalized Wardrop equilibrium. In particular, our results imply that using decentralized marginal cost tolls, stability of the dynamic transportation network is guaranteed to be around the social optimum traffic assignment. This is particularly remarkable as such feedback tolls can be computed in a fully local way without the need for any global information about the network structure, its state, or the exogenous network loads. Through numerical simulations, we also compare the performance of such decentralized dynamic feedback tolls with constant off-line (and centrally) optimized tolls both in the asymptotic and in the transient regime and we investigate their robustness to delays.
I. INTRODUCTION
Over the past years there has been an increasing interest in the control systems analysis and synthesis of dynamical transportation networks. Such interest is especially motivated by the wide-spreading sensing, communication, information, and actuation technologies that are dramatically changing the transportation system dynamics and affecting the users' decision making and behaviors. There is a growing awareness that the new opportunities and risks created by these technologies can be fully understood within a dynamical network framework.
Traditional traffic flow control strategies include mechanisms such as variable speed limits, ramp metering, or traffic signal control (see [1] - [4] and references therein). While such mechanisms do not consider neither the drivers' perspective nor affect the total amount of vehicles, there has been also a significant research effort to understand the drivers' answer to external communications from intelligent traveller information devices (see, e.g., [5] - [6] ) and, in particular, studying the effect of such technologies on the drivers' route choice behaviour and on the dynamical properties of the transportation network [7] . A traffic recommender which can announce potentially misleading travel time information and a new class of latency functions so as to influence the drivers' behaviour was studied in [8] and [9] , respectively. Moreover, it is known that if individual drivers make their own routing decisions to minimize their own experienced delays, overall network congestion can be considerably higher than if a central planner had the ability to explicitly direct traffic. Accordingly, to charge tolls for the purpose of influencing drivers to make routing choices that result in globally optimal routing was a central research focus (see [10] - [15] ).
In this paper, we extend the model and results of [7] by introducing decentralized congestion-dependent tolls in order to influence the driver's route choice behaviour. Specifically, we consider a multiscale dynamical model of the transportation network whereby the traffic dynamics describing the real time evolution of the local congestion level are coupled with those of the drivers' path preferences. We assume that the latter evolve following a perturbed best response to global information about the congestion status of the whole network and to decentralized flow-dependent tolls.
Our main result shows that by using non-decreasing decentralized flow-dependent tolls and in the limit of a small update rate of the aggregate path preferences, the transportation network globally stabilises around the Wardrop equilibrium [16] . The latter is a configuration in which the perceived cost associated to any source-destination path chosen by a nonzero fraction of drivers does not exceed the perceived cost associated to any other path. As in [7] , we assume that the drivers' path preferences evolve at a slower time scale than the physical traffic flows and adopt a singular perturbation approach [17] to the stability analysis of the ensuing multiscale closed-loop traffic dynamics. Note that classic results of evolutionary game theory and population dynamics [18] - [19] cannot be applied to our framework since they suppose that the access to information take place at a single temporal and spatial scale and that the traffic dynamics are neglected by assuming that they are instantaneously equilibrated.
The introduction of tolls has long been studied as a way to influence the rational and selfish behaviour of drivers so that the associated Wardrop equilibrium can align with the system optimum network flow. A well-studied taxation mechanism that guarantees this alignment is marginal-cost pricing (see, e.g., [20] and [21] ). Marginal-cost tolls do not require any global information about the network structure, user demands or state and can be computed in a fully local way. Using marginal-cost tolls we prove that our transportation network stabilizes around the social optimum traffic assignment. It is worth observing that our results go well beyond the traditional setting [20] where only static frameworks are considered as well as [21] where only path preference dynamics are consider, neglecting the physical ones that are assumed equilibrated. In fact, our analysis is carried over in a fully dynamical flow network setting. In this respect, the global optimality guarantees that are obtained in this paper through decentralized feedback toll policies should be compared with other recent results on global performance and resilience results on robust distributed control of dynamical flow networks [22] - [26] .
In the last part of the paper through numerical simulations we compare the performance both asymptotic and during the transient of the system by using distributed marginal cost tolls and constant marginal cost ones. The latter, know in the literature as "fixed" tolls (being the tolling function on each edge a constant function of edge flow) have been well studied, and it is known that they can be computed to enforce the social optimum equilibrium provided that the system planner has a complete knowledge of the network topology, user demand profile and delay functions. We show that not only is more convenient take into account the marginal cost tolls at convergence speed level but also they are strongly robust to variation of network topology, user demand and traffic rate (see [27] and [28] ). At the end we insert a time-delay in the global information of the slow scale dynamics and show how that influences the evolution of the multi-scale dynamical system. For different values of the previous delay, one observes a different behaviour of the system depending on whether you use the marginal cost tolls instead of the constant marginal cost ones. With the latter, the system remains stable and converges to the equilibrium, instead with the former a phase transition and an oscillatory behaviour emerge as the delay increases.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In Section II, we describe the model and observe the influence of distributed dynamics tolls on the network dynamics. In Section III we state the main results of the paper which proofs are showed in section IV. In Section V we provide a numerical study of the different time and asymptotic convergences of the system. Section VI draws conclusions and suggests future works.
A. Notation
Let R and R + := {x ∈ R : x ≥ 0} be the set of real and nonnegative real numbers, respectively. Let A and B be finite sets. Then |A| denotes the cardinality of A, R A the space of real-valued vectors whose components are indexed by elements of A, and R A×B the space of real-valued matrices whose entries are indexed by pairs in A × B. The transpose of a matrix Q ∈ R A×B is denoted by Q ∈ R B×A , I is an identity matrix and 1 an all one vector whose size depends on the context. We use the notation Φ := I − |A| −1 11 ∈ R A×A to denote the projection matrix of the space orthogonal to 1. The simplex of a probability vector over A is denoted by S(A) = {x ∈ R A + : 1 x = 1}. Let · p be the class of p-norms for p ∈ [1, ∞], and by default, let · := · 2 . Let now sgn : R → {−1, 0, 1} be the sign function, defined by sgn(x) = 1 if x > 0, sgn(x) = −1 if x < 0 and sgn(x) = 0 if x = 0. By convention, we will assume the identity d|x|/dx = sgn(x) to be valid for every x ∈ R, including x = 0. Finally, given the gradient ∇f of a function f : D → R with D ⊆ R A , we denote with∇f = Φ∇f the projected gradient on S(A).
II. MODEL DESCRIPTION A. Transportation network
We model the topology of the transportation network as a directed multi-graph G = (V, E), where V is a finite set of nodes and E is a finite set of directed links. Each link i in E is directed from its tail node θ i to its head node κ i = θ i . We shall allow for parallel links, i.e., links i = j such that θ i = θ j and κ i = κ j , hence the prefix in multi-graphs. On the other hand, we shall assume that there are no self-loops, i.e., that θ i = κ i for every i in E. We shall denote by B ∈ {−1, 0, 1} V×E the node-link incidence matrix of G, whose entries are given by
A length-l path from a node v 0 to a node v l is a string of links γ = (γ 1 , γ 2 , . . . , γ l ) such that the tail node of the first link is θ γ1 = v 0 , the head node of the last link is κ l = v l , the tail node of the next link coincides with the head node of the previous link, i.e., v s = κ γs = θ γs+1 for 1 ≤ s ≤ l − 1, and no node is visited twice, i.e., v r = v s for all 0 ≤ r < s ≤ l, except possibly for v 0 = v l , in which case the path is referred to a cycle. A node d is said to be reachable from another node o if there exists at least a path from o to d. Observe that, in contrast to [7] where the transportation network was assumed to be cycle-free, in this paper we allow for the presence of cycles.
Throughout the paper, we will consider a given origin node o and a destination node d = o that is reachable from o and let Γ be the set of paths from o to d of any length l ≥ 1. Denote the corresponding link-path incidence matrix by A ∈ {0, 1} E×Γ with entries
We shall refer to nonnegative vectors y ∈ R E + generally as flow vectors. A flow vector y such that
for some λ ≥ 0 will be referred to as an o-d equilibrium flow vector of throughput λ. For λ ≥ 0, let us consider the simplex
Observe that, for z ∈ S λ , one has BAz = λ(δ
is an o-d equilibrium flow vector of throughput λ. Throughout, we shall refer to any z ∈ S λ as a path preference vector and to y z defined as in (3) as the associated equilibrium flow vector.
Each link i of the transportation network topology G represents a cell. We shall denote the traffic volume in and the outflow from cell i ∈ E by x i and y i , respectively. We shall assume that traffic volume and outflow of each cell are related by a functional dependence
satisfying the following property.
1 Assumption 1. For every link i ∈ E the flow function ϕ i : R + → R + is twice continuously differentiable, strictly increasing, strictly concave, and such that
For every link i in E, let
be its maximum flow capacity. Denote by
the cell's latency function, returning the delay incurred by drivers traversing link i ∈ E, when the current flow out of it is y i . The following simple but useful result is proven in Appendix A. Lemma 1. Let ϕ i : R + → R + be a flow function satisfying Assumption 1. Then, the corresponding latency function τ i defined in (5) is twice continuously differentiable, strictly increasing on the interval [0, C i ), and such that τ i (0) > 0. Moreover, its first derivative is given by
and the function y → yτ i (y) is strictly convex on [0, C i ).
Let us now define the set of feasible flow vectors as
and the set of feasible path preferences as
Moreover, let the total latency associated to a flow vector
Observe that the total latency L(y) is finite if and only if the flow vector y is feasible. In fact, as a consequence of Lemma 1, we have that the total latency function L(y) is a strictly convex function of y ∈ F. Notice that, by the max-flow mincut theorem (see [29] , Thm. 4.1), the set of feasible flows F , where
= min
is the min-cut capacity. It then follows that, for every λ
), the total latency L(y) admits a unique minimizer y * (λ) in the set of feasible equilibrium o-d flows of throughput λ. We shall refer to such unique minimizer
as the social optimum equilibrium flow.
Example 1.
Consider the network in Figure 1 with node set V = {o, a, b, d} and link set E = {e 1 , e 2 , e 3 , e 4 , e 5 , e 6 }. It contains four distinct paths from o to d. In fact, we may write
= (e 2 , e 6 ), γ (3) = (e 1 , e 3 , e 6 ), and γ (4) = (e 2 , e 4 , e 5 ). Note that there is a cycle γ (o) = (e 3 , e 4 ). For each link i ∈ E, let the flow functions be given by
where C i > 0 is link i's capacity. Then, the corresponding latency functions are given by
Plots of the flow function (9) and of the latency function (10) are reported in Figure 2 . In the special case when the link capacities are ).
B. Multi-scale model of network traffic flow dynamics
We shall consider a physical traffic flow consisting of indistinguishable homogeneous drivers entering the network from the origin node o at a constant unit rate, traveling through it on the different paths and finally exiting the network from Figure 3 . In (a), plot of the minimum total latency as a function of the throughput λ for a transportation network with topology as in Figure 1 , flow functions as in (9), and link capacities as in 11. In (b), plots of the corresponding social optimum flow vector y * (λ).
the destination node d. Conservation of mass implies that the traffic volume on link i at time t evolves aṡ
where
is the total outflow from link i, the term R ij (t) stands for the fraction of outflow from link i that moves directly towards link j, and the term λδ
θi accounts for the constant exogenous inflow in the origin node o. Topological constraints and mass conservation imply that R ij (t) = 0 whenever κ i = θ j , i.e., whenever link j is not immediately downstream of link i, and that j∈E R ij (t) = 1 for every i ∈ E such that θ i = d. The matrix R(t) = (R ij (t)) i,j∈E will be referred to as the routing matrix.
Throughout, we shall assume that the routing matrix is determined by the drivers' preferences that are continuously updated in response to available congestion information and dynamic tolls. Formally, the relative appeal of the different paths to the drivers is modelled by a time-varying nonnegative vector z(t) in the simplex S λ , to be referred to as the current aggregate path preference. 2 We shall assume that such aggregate path preferences determine the routing matrix as
2 Recall that S λ stands for the simplex over the set of o-d-paths Γ, as defined in (2). for i, j ∈ E and t ≥ 0, where G :
for each cell j in E and it is continuously differentiable.
Equations (14) and (15) state that at every junction, represented by a node v in V, the outflow from every incoming cell i such that κ i = v gets split among the cells j immediately downstream (i.e., such that θ j = v) according to the proportion associated to the equilibrium flow vector y z corresponding to the path preference z, provided that y z is such there is flow passing through node v, and otherwise the split is uniform among the immediately downstream cells.
In our dynamical network traffic model, the aggregate path preference vector z(t) is continuously updated as drivers access global information about the current congestion status of the whole network embodied by the vector
of current latencies on the different links. The aggregate path preference vector is also influenced by a vector w(t) = (w i (t)) i∈E of dynamic tolls, that are to be determined by the transportation system operator. Specifically, let the cost perceived by each user, crossing a link i ∈ E, be given by the sum of the latency l i (t) and the toll w i (t) so that the perceived total cost that a driver expects to incur on a path γ ∈ Γ assuming that the congestion levels on that path won't change during the journey is i A iγ (l i (t) + w i (t)). We shall then assume that the path preferences are updated at some rate η > 0, according to a noisy best response dynamicṡ
where for every fixed noise parameter β > 0 the function
is the perturbed best response defined as follows:
We shall rewrite the coupled dynamics of the physical flow and the path preferences defined in (12)- (18) in the compact notation
where H : F × Z → R E is defined as
III. PROBLEM STATEMENT AND MAIN RESULTS
The goal of this paper is to design robust scalable feedback pricing policies ω :
determining in real time the dynamic tolls
with the objectives of guaranteeing stability and achieving social optimality for the closed-loop network traffic flow dynamics (19)- (22) . Observe that, for any given fixed inflow λ and constant tolls w, stability and convergence to the corresponding Wardrop equilibrium -as defined later in this section-follow from the results in [7] . In fact, given full knowledge of the exogenous inflow λ and of the whole transportation network characteristics, one could use classical results in order to pre-compute static tolls that would align such Wardrop equilibrium with the social optimum. However, such an approach would result in an inadequate solution as it would lack robustness with respect to the value of the exogenous input λ, as well as to changes of the network characteristics in response, e.g., to accidents and other disruptions.
In contrast, we seek to design feedback pricing policies that are universal with respect to values of the exogenous inflow and robustly adapt in real time to changes of the network characteristics. We shall particularly focus on the class of decentralized monotone feedback pricing policies, as defined below.
Definition 1. In a transportation network with topology G = (V, E), a feedback pricing policy ω : F → R E + is said to be: (i) monotone if ω(y) ≥ ω(y ) for every y, y ∈ F such that y ≥ y , where inequalities are meant to hold true entrywise; (ii) decentralized if, for every i ∈ E, the toll w i = ω i (y) is a function of the flow y i on link i only.
Throughout the rest of the paper, we shall emphasize the local structure of decentralized pricing policies by writing w i = ω i (y i ), with a slight abuse of notation. As shown in the following, such robust fully local feedback pricing policies can be designed with global guarantees on stability and optimality. Before stating our main results, we introduce the notion of generalized Wardrop equilibrium with feedback pricing. Equation (23) states that the sum of the total delay and the total toll associated to an o-d path γ at the equilibrium flow y are less than or equal to the sum of the total delay and the total toll associated to any other o-d pathγ. Hence, a generalized Wardrop equilibrium with feedback pricing is characterized as being the flow associated to a path preference vector supported on the subset of paths with minimal sum of total latency plus total toll. In the special case with no tolls, i.e., when the feedback pricing policy ω(y) ≡ 0, this reduces to the classical notion of Wardrop equilibrium [16] . More in general, for constant tolls ω(y) ≡ w we get the standard notion of Wardrop equilibrium with tolls. For general decentralized monotone feedback pricing policies, existence and uniqueness of a generalized Wardrop equilibrium are guaranteed by the following result proven in Appendix B.
Proposition ω) and it can be characterized as the solution of the convex optimization problem
where, for each link i ∈ E,
is the primitive of the perceived cost
In the following, we shall prove that for small η and large β, the long-time behaviour of the system (19) is approximately at Wardrop equilibrium which, under proper distributed feedback pricing policies, coincides with the social optimum equilibrium. The following is the main result of the paper. It will be proved in the next section using a singular perturbation approach. 
whereδ(η) is a nonnegative-real-valued, nondecreasing function such that lim η→0δ (η) = 0. Moreover,
Theorem 1 states that the system planner globally stabilises the transportation network around the Wardrop equilibrium using non-decreasing decentralised congestion-dependent tolls. Remark 1. Note that Theorem 1 does not follow from Theorem 2.5 in [7] . Indeed, although the functions τ and ω both depend on the flow y, it is not possible consider an auxiliary functionτ = τ + ω and directly apply the result from [7] due to the specific structure imposed on τ in (5). Moreover, to better understand the evolution process of the multiscale transportation networks, see Figure 4 . Now, we choose as decentralized feedback tolls the marginal cost tolls, namely,
Due the properties of the delay function τ i , the above tolls (28) are increasing, then the Theorem 1 continue to hold. Moreover the following holds Corollary 1. Consider (28) as the decentralized congestiondependent tolls that influence the system (19) . Then the latter globally stabilises the transportation network around the social optimum traffic assignment y * (λ), i.e., one has
for every λ > 0 and this is possible without knowing arrival rates or the network structure.
Proof. First notice that with feedback marginal cost tolls ω i (y i ) = y i τ i (y i ), the perceived cost τ i (y i ) + ω i (y i ) on each link i ∈ E has primitive
coincides with the total latency. It then follows from the characterization (24) of Proposition 1 that
The claim then follows as a direct application of Theorem 1.
Remark 2. It can be easily seen that Corollary 1 holds true also if the dynamic feedback marginal cost tolls (28) are replaced by the constant marginal cost tolls
However, in contrast to the dynamic feedback marginal cost tolls (28), such constant marginal cost tolls (30) require knowledge both of the social optimum flow and the exogenous inflow λ and lack robustness with respect to changes of the value of λ, as well as to changes of the network.
Remark 3. In order to implement the dynamic feedback marginal cost tolls (28), each local controller is required to compute the product y i τ i (y i ) of the link's current flow times the link's latency function's derivative. Notice that, using (5), we get
Hence, it is possible to carry the problem of the knowledge of τ i to the computation of the derivative of the flow function ϕ i .
IV. PROOF OF THEOREM 1
In this section, we prove Theorem 1. First of all, notice that since the functions F (β) , G, and ϕ are differentiable, standard results imply the existence and uniqueness of a solution of the initial value problem associated to (19) . In order to prove the stability result, we shall adopt a singular perturbation approach. Our strategy consists in thinking of the path preference vector z as quasi-static when we analyse the fast-scale dynamics (12) , and considering the flow vector y almost equilibrated (i.e., close to y z ) when study the slow-scale dynamics (17) . Then we will give a series of intermediate results that will turn out to be useful to complete the proof of Theorem 1.
Before proceeding, we introduce some notation to be used throughout the section. Similar to (16) and (22) let
and
be respectively, the vector of current latencies and the one of dynamic tolls both corresponding to the flow y z associated to the path preference z.
Furthermore, observe that the perturbed best response function (18) satisfies
where h : Z → R is the negative entropy function defined as
using the standard convention that 0 log 0 = 0. In fact, all our analysis and results apply to a more general setting where the perturbed best response function is defined as
for some admissible perturbation h : Z h → R such that Z h ⊆ Z is a closed convex set, h(·) is strictly convex, twice differentiable in int(Z h ), and lim z→∂Z h ∇ h(z) = ∞. These conditions on h imply that F h (l, w) ∈ int(Z h ) and that it is continuously differentiable on R E + × R E + . Notice that clearly the negative entropy function (32) is an admissible perturbation as defined above. We shall then proceed to proving Theorem 1 in this more general setting. Now, let
) denote, respectively, the density corresponding to the flow associated to the path preference z and the sign of the difference between it and the actual density x i . Then, we define the functions
The technical Lemmas aim at showing that (34) are Lyapunov functions for the fast-scale dynamics (12) with stationary path preference z.
Lemma 2. Let E ⊆ E be a nonempty set of cells. Then,
and the claim follows immediately.
We can then focus on the case when d / ∈ V. Let
be the total inflow in V which is also equal to the total outflow from V. Indeed α in (36) can be also written as 
hence proving the claim.
where ς = 1/|V||E|.
Proof. Observe that by (15) we get
We will use the above in the second equality of the computation below. Indeed we have
Now, define E = {i ∈ E : σ i = 0}
and put
We have that
Then by (40)
by using Lemma 2
The following two results show that both y z i (t) and y i (t) stay bounded away from the maximum flow capacity C i . Lemma 4. Given the admissible perturbation (32), there exists t 0 ∈ R + and, for every link i ∈ E, a finite positive constant C i , dependent on h, but not on η, such that for every initial condition (z(0),
Proof. The fact that y z i (t) ≤ λ for all i ∈ E follows from the fact that the arrival rate at the origin is unitary. Hence, for all i ∈ E with C i > λ (and therefore also for C i = ∞) the claim follow with C i = λ and t 0 = 0. We now consider the case when C i < λ for all i ∈ E. Recall that by the definition of admissible perturbation, the domain of (32) is a closed set Z β ⊆ int(Z). This implies that
It follows from (18) that
Hence, one gets
This implies that
where the last inequality comes from the fact that y z i (0) ≤ λ and C i ≥ ξ i . The lemma for i ∈ E with C i < λ now follows from (42) by choosing, for example, C i := C i − ξ/2 with ξ := min{ξ i : i ∈ E s.t. C i < λ} and t 0 := −η −1 log(ξ/2λ).
Lemma 5. Given the admissible perturbation (32), there exists η * > 0 and a finite positive constantC i for every i ∈ E, dependent on h, but not on η, such that for every η < η * and every initial condition (z(0),
Proof. For t ≥ 0, let us define
where V and W are defined in (34). By the Lemma 4 there exists t 0 ≥ 0 and a positive constant C i for every i ∈ E, such that for every t ≥ t 0 and applying the inverse of the function ϕ i we get − ς χ * + 2ληµ ds < 0 for any t > u ≥ t * such that t and u belong to the same connected component of T . But this contradicts the definition of the set T . Hence, if η < η * then lim sup t→∞ y i (t) < C i for any i ∈ E. Since on every compact time interval I ⊆ R + , one has sup t∈I y i (t) = y i (t) < C i for somet ∈ I, the previous implies the claim. Lemma 6. There exists K > 0 and t 1 ≥ 0 such that for every initial condition (z(0),
Proof. By the Lemma 5, there exist T * , υ * > 0 such that l(t) ≤ T * and w(t) ≤ υ * for all t ≥ 0. This fact together with the definition of
Since ∆(t) is an average of elements of the convex set K, then ∆(t) ∈ K ∀t ≥ 0. Moreover, z(t) = e −ηt z(0)+(1−e −ηt )∆(t) approaches K, which implies that for large enough t, z(t) ∈ K 1 , where K 1 is a closed subset of int(Z β ) that contains K. Hence, after large enough t, say, t 1 ,∇ z h(z(t)) stays bounded.
Lemma 7.
There exist > 0 and t 0 ≥ 0 such that for every initial condition (z(0),
Proof. Observe that thanks to Lemma 4 there exist t 0 ≥ 0 such that i := sup{1/ϕ i (x z i (t)) : t ≥ t 0 } < +∞. Put := max{ i : i ∈ E}. Then, for every path γ ∈ Γ and for every t ≥ t 0 , one has
Therefore,
We now combine Lemmas 3 and 7 in order to estimate the behaviour in time of W (x(t), z(t)).
Lη|E| ς for t ≥ t 0 and η < η * .
Proof. Define ζ(t) := W (x(t), z(t)). Note that thanks to Lemmas 4 and 5, there exist L > 0, η * > 0 and t 0 ≥ 0 such that for any η < η * ,
This involves that
Moreover W (x, z) is a Lipschitz function of x and z, while both x(t) and z(t) are Lipschitz on every compact time interval. Therefore ζ(t) is Lipschitz on every compact time interval and hence absolutely continuous. Thus dζ(t)/dt exists for almost every t ≥ 0, and, thanks to Lemmas 3 and 7 it satisfies
Then, integrating both sides we get the claim.
A. Proof of Theorem 1
Now we are able to prove Theorem 1. Let us consider the function
and observe that whereC := max{1,C i : i ∈ E}, withC i as defined in Lemma 5. It can be proved thatδ(r) is nondecreasing, right-continuous, and such that lim η→0δ (η) =δ(0) = 0. Then, (52) and (55) imply that for η < η * ,
Note that since y(t)
≤C for all i ∈ E and hence y(t) − y (ω,β) 2 ≤ |E|C 2 . Then (56) also holds for η ≥ η * , since in that rangeδ(r) =C |E|. This together with Lemma 9 conclude the proof.
V. ASYMPTOTIC AND TRANSIENT PERFORMANCES
In this section, we will present a numerical study comparing both the asymptotic and the transient performance of multiscale transportation networks controlled by dynamic feedback marginal cost tolls (28) and constant marginal cost tolls (30) .
We performed several numerical simulations with different graph topologies and for several values of the parameter η. In all of our simulations we found that dynamic feedback marginal cost tolls outperform constant marginal ones. Indeed:
• concerning the transient convergence, it appears that the time needed to reach the perturbed equilibrium associated to the dynamic feedback marginal cost tolls is lower than the time to reach the perturbed equilibrium associated to the constant marginal ones.
• as the noise parameter β of the route choice goes to infinity the perturbed equilibrium associated to dynamic feedback marginal cost tolls asymptotically converges to the social optimum flow faster than the one associated to the constant marginal cost tolls. We illustrate these findings in the following simple case:
• network topology G as in Fig. 5; • flow-density function as in (9) and corresponding delay function as in (10) , with capacity C i = 2 for every i ∈ E; • F (β) as in (18) , η = 0.1, G as in (15) and λ = 1;
Having settled a time horizon T = 350, Fig. 6 displays the 1-norm distance and the latency loss of y (ω,β) (T ) from the system optimum y * , for different values of the noise parameter 1/β. This is done both considering (28) and the constant marginal tolls (30) . Note that while our theoretical results guarantee that y (ω,β) (T ) converges to y * only in the double limit of large T (asymptotically in time) and large β (vanishing noise), in our numerical examples convergence is practically observed already for relatively small values of β. Our simulations also suggest that convergence of y (ω,β) (T ) to the system optimum is faster for the feedback marginal cost tolls (28) than for the fixed marginal cost (30) . Hence, in addition to variations of network's parameters and exogenous loads, feedback marginal cost tolls appear to be more robust than their constant counterparts also when it comes to noise.
A. Effect of delays
In this section we study the effects of delays in the global information of the slow scale dynamics (17) on the system (19) . Considering at first the case of marginal cost tolls, we take a time-delay φ and l i (t − φ) + w i (t − φ) as the cost perceived by each user crossing a link i ∈ E. Fixing the noise parameter β and varying φ, we observe how changes the timeevolution of the density x and how the correspondent flow y approximates the social optimum flow y * (λ) with λ = 1. For that, we use the graph topology as in Fig. 5 and the same parameters as before. Then, fixing β = 5, we perform the trajectory x for different value of φ as show in the Fig. 7 . In Figure 7 (a) and 7(b) we can note that the density converges to the equilibrium. By numerical simulations one gets that φ = 9 is the bigger value for which one has convergence (see Fig.  7(b) ), because for φ > 9 one witness a phase transition of the system, namely one observes an oscillatory behaviour. We can also note in Figure 7 (c) and 7(d) that the bigger φ is the greater the oscillation amplitude and phase. A similar situation can be seen in the plot of the 1-norm distance of y from y * in Fig. 8 , for the same value of φ used in Figure 7 .
Consider now the case of constant marginal cost tolls (30) . Let φ be the time delay as before and τ i (y i (t − φ)) + w * i the cost perceived by each user crossing a link i ∈ E. Still using the graph topology as in Fig. 5 and fixing β = 5 we perform the trajectory x and the 1-norm distance of the correspond flow y from y * with the different values of φ used before. From Figure 9 we can note that for all considered values of φ the trajectory x converges to the equilibrium. This differs from what happens using the marginal cost tolls (see Figure 7) and highlights how time-delays affect marginal cost tolls more than their constant counterpart. The plot of the 1-norm, Fig. 10 , confirms the same trend, indeed after some initial oscillations, the 1-norm is the same for the different values of φ. 
VI. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we studied the stability of Wardrop equilibria of multi-scale transportation networks with distributed dynamic tolls. In particular, we prove that if the frequency of updates of path preferences is sufficiently small and considering positive, non-decreasing decentralized flow-dependent tolls, then the state of the network ultimately approaches a neighborhood of the Wardrop equilibrium. Then, using a particular class of tolls, i.e., the marginal cost ones, we observe that the stability is around the social optimum equilibrium and, thanks to numerical experiments, the performances both asymptotic and during the transient of the system is better than the one obtained considering the constant marginal tolls. Moreover, assuming the existence of a time delay in the global information of the slowscale dynamics, we highlight, through numerical simulations, as this delay influences the stability and convergence of the dynamical system, both in the case in which one considers marginal cost tolls and constant marginal cost ones. In future research, inspired by the numerical results we will provide analytic estimates about the different convergence rates. Moreover, we also plan to define a more general class of tolls that does not require the knowledge neither of the derivatives of the delay functions and at the same time guarantees the convergence to the social optimum.
APPENDIX A PROOF OF LEMMA 1
The fact that τ i is twice continuously differentiable on [0, C i ), strictly increasing and such that τ i (0) > 0 directly follows from Assumption 1. We prove now that y → yτ i (y) is strictly convex computing its second derivative. For a given y ∈ [0, C i ), let x = ϕ Now, observe that Assumption 1 guarantees that a > 0 and b > 0. Hence, (yτ i (y)) > 0 and therefore yτ i (y) is strictly convex, thus completing the proof.
APPENDIX B PROOF OF PROPOSITION 1 From Assumption 1 and the fact that the toll on a link is a non-decreasing function of the flow on that link only, it follows that the perceived cost function τ i (y i ) + ω i (y i ) on link i is continuous, strictly increasing, and grater than zero when y i = 0. The claim then follows as a direct application of Theorems 2.4 and 2.5 in [30] .
